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Abstract 
This paper explains the importance of distinguishing de facto from 
de jure property rights, confused by some economists, in heritage 
conservation planning.  A comparative study on three Hong Kong 
examples of British colonial military buildings is used to show how 
neither de jure private property rights nor de facto close access is 
a solution to the problem of open access to heritage buildings.  
Also, a government museum is only a partial solution to the 
problem of promoting an authentic historic sense of history in a 
post-colonial environment. The examples to be examined are the 
coastal gun batteries on Devil’s Peak, the coastal gun batteries on 
Cape D’Aguilar, and the Museum of Coastal Defence inside the old 
Lei Yue Mun Fort.  With the help of site photos, the case studies 
demonstrate that heritage buildings can only be preserved when 
at least three conditions are satisfied: (a) there is an intention to 
conserve; (b) there is a viable scheme to conserve; and (c) there is 
effective regulation of access.  Open access, however, can have 
some merits as a process of information discovery by members of 
the public. 
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Introduction 
Post-colonial military heritage conservation is often driven by the 
curiosity of local researchers who rediscover the past in sealed-up 
or overgrown locations. Unlike the case of Portuguese Macau, 
where the departing colonial regime took great pains to 
systematically rehabilitate major European examples of built 
civilian and military heritage, the British administration did not 
have a great interest in doing the same in Singapore (Lai and Ho 
2003). The Battle Box on Fort Canning Hill2 is a case in point.  This 
major Allied command centre during the Battle of Singapore, 
sealed up under unknown circumstances during the 1960s, was 
not “rediscovered” and opened up for conservation tourism until 
1988 – and only due to the research of National University of 
Singapore scholars (Bose 2012).  It would be unreasonable to say 
that from the fall of the city in 1942 to 1988, the Battle Box was 
2 Hong Kong had its own Battle Box.  Located near Queensway, Admiralty, it was sealed 
after the war and demolished due to the development of a hotel at about the time the 
Fort Canning Battle Box reopened for study.  Had Hong Kong’s version been 
incorporated into the hotel, it would have become a major tourist attraction. 
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“well-conserved” by virtue of the fact that it was sealed up and 
forgotten.  Which structure should be designated and conserved 
as a “heritage building” and how is a controversial subject fought 
between the majority who accept only a subjectivist and relativist 
“social construct” view and those who agree that there are 
intrinsic and universalist values inherent in heritage (Agency for 
Cultural Affairs (Government of Japan) 1993). However, no 
expert in conservation would agree that merely closing up a place 
to the public or erasing its existence from collective memory is a 
correct way to conserve a piece of heritage, which requires a 
dimension of public knowledge and access.  However, careless 
abstract economic thinking can generate propositions that point 
towards enclosure. 
This paper clarifies the distinction between de facto and de 
jure rights to correct two major errors can be found in the 
economic literature, which testifies to the importance of having a 
good understanding of the “real world,” especially through the 
eyes of a development theorist when undertaking economic 
theorization. Dealing with practical urban issues, development 
theorists are often more sensitive than economists to the specific 
dimensions of property rights. 
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The first mistake is to divorce de facto property rights from 
de jure property rights by treating the latter as if they are merely 
an epiphenomenon or a kind of parameter.  Both de facto and de 
jure property rights are imperative because a widening gap 
between them (i.e., ambiguity in property rights) may entail major 
political changes (Lai and Lorne 2014). 
The second error is confusing de jure and de facto property 
rights.  Although common property is, in most instances, open 
access, open access property is not necessarily common property.  
This paper deals with the second type of error and explains the 
importance of distinguishing de facto from de jure property rights 
in heritage conservation planning.  Three post-colonial Hong Kong 
examples are used to demonstrate this distinction. 
Using basic property rights concepts and with the help of 
site photos, this paper uses a comparative study on three Hong 
Kong examples of British colonial military buildings to show how 
neither de jure private property rights nor de facto close access is 
a solution to the problem of open access to heritage buildings.  
Also, a government museum is only a partial solution to the 
problem of promoting an authentic historic sense of history in a 
post-colonial environment. 
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The following section explains the theoretical landscape of 
the property rights in relation to heritage research. 
Theoretical context 
The application of the property rights concepts of “the tragedy of 
the commons” and “open access” to heritage research has been 
growing (for instance Howell 1994, Russo 2002, Webster and Lai 
2003).  This paper attempts to make a contribution to heritage 
research by clarifying the basic difference between “common 
access” and “common property” and illustrates, by way of three 
case studies, the application of these concepts to a discussion of 
military heritage. 
Economists Anthony Scott Gordon (1954), Armen Alchian 
and Harod Demsetz (1973), and Steven Cheung (1970, 1987) have, 
over the last 60 years, identified and elaborated on the nature of 
three distinct types of property rights: common, communal, and 
private.  Common law recognises these three types of rights, but 
only enforces the latter two. 
 
There exist two different classifications of property rights 
regimes due to differences in the theoretical thinking of two 
economic schools of thought.  One school, best represented by 
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Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom (2000) and in agreement with the 
ideas of Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975), accepts a simple 
dichotomy between common and private property.  The other, 
which may be called the UCLA School represented by Alchian and 
Demsetz (1973) and Cheung (1987), differentiates communal 
from common and arrives at a threefold and finer distinction 
between common, communal, and private property.  In this paper, 
the authors prefer the Alchian-Demsetz-Cheung distinction 
between common and communal property not only on the 
grounds that their distinction articulates well with the much older 
resource economic research on ocean fisheries by Gordon (1954), 
who described ocean fish as common property almost 60 years 
ago, a concept adopted for instance by Feeny et al. (1996) 
because the finer threefold distinction between common, 
communal, and private property helps make a theoretical 
distinction more precise.  Cheung adopted (1970) Gordon’s 1954 
terminology of common property and defined “common 
property” as a state of affairs subject to unrestrained competition.  
In other words, it is “non-exclusive” property (Cheung 1970).  It 
was in Cheung’s, rather than Ostrom’s (2000), sense that Stroup 
(2005) merged the two concepts of open access and common 
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property into the composite concept of “open access common 
property”. 
 
Common property is often equated with open access 
property informed by Hardin’s (1968) now famous concept of 
open access to resources.  The two concepts, though related, are 
distinct.  Uphoff and Langholz (1998: 252) correctly saw the need 
for such a distinction (equating common property with communal 
property) by saying that: 
…we need to distinguish ‘open access’ resources, 
which are what Hardin (1968) was describing, from 
‘common property’ resources, which are less likely to 
become degraded in that they are governed by social 
norms and conventions (Berkes 1989; Bromley & 
Feeny 1992; Jodha 1992). 
 
In effect, Uphoff and Langholz (1998) held that “open access” 
resources are, in the terminology of Alchian and Demsetz (1973), 
distinct from resources under “communal property”. Elinor 
Ostrom, also pointed out that the debate over property rights 
regimes “has been clouded by a troika of confusions that relate to 
the difference between (1) common property and open-access 
regimes, (2) common-pool resources and common property 
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regimes, and (3) a resource system and the flow of resource units” 
(Ostrom 2000: 332).  As regards the first confusion, Ostrom’s 
approach was to follow the distinction made by Ciriacy-Wantrup 
and Bishop (1975).1  Ostrom’s distinction is the same as that of 
Uphoff and Langholz (1998) in that it described what Alchian and 
Demsetz (1973) would take pains to describe as “communal 
property” and “common property.” 
 Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” describes a physical 
state of affairs concerning resources, namely open access ones, 
which may or may not be “common” property rights.  
Unfortunately, many wrongly assume that resources under open 
access are always common property and that assigning or 
recognising private property rights to a resource solves the 
problem of open access. 
This misconception is due to a failure to distinguish between 
de facto and de jure realities.  More often than not, many 
supposed “common properties” are either officially private or at 
least under communal ownership.  Hardin should not be blamed 
for this.  In his frequently cited work, he gave the example of 
overgrazing to describe open access to communal pastures that 
were treated as “common” in an earlier paper by Bottomley 
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(1963).  These “common pastures” are not truly common 
property in the sense that access to them is not unlimited and 
open, but communal (according to Alchian), because they are 
defended by the community of a polity.  In fact, the only true 
examples of common property on Earth are the high seas and 
Antarctica.  There is little land elsewhere that has not been 
claimed by any nation-state as its sovereign territory.  Whether or 
not such a claim is effective in the face of contesting claimants or 
squatters is another matter. 
Table 1 is a 4 X 3 matrix with four types of de jure property 
rights (private property rights further differentiated into those 
held by individuals and those by the state3) by column and three 
de facto modes of access restriction. 
Table 1 about here 
(Table 1: A matrix of property rights and physical access to 
resources) 
 Table 1 was developed according to the received views of 
classifying regimes that govern competition for resources rather 
than a typology of economic organisations. In the table, the cells 
3 Strictly, there is no need for such distinction.  However, this recognizes the interest of 
those who consider state property as essentially different due to the nature of 
government, which is supposed to serve as a custodian for all citizens. 
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along the de jure row under Columns A, B, and C are those that 
have hitherto been focused on by neo-institutional economists.  
We completed the picture by adding the dimension of de facto 
access to each de jure entry, which includes state ownership as a 
form of private property.  
When a resource is open access, the “dissipation of rent” 
due to competition by entrants would occur.  For heritage 
buildings, some quarrying of building materials will happen.  Rent 
dissipation occurred when the scramble for building materials 
produced human and material losses.  What has happened to the 
Coliseum in Rome due to scavenging for metallic fixers and stones 
is a case in point (Downs and Medina 2000).  Heritage buildings, 
upon identification, can only be preserved when the following 
minimal conditions are satisfied: (a) there is an intention to 
conserve; (b) there is a viable scheme to conserve; and (c) there is 
effective regulation of access for the purpose of conservation.  
While private ownership by individual citizens may be regarded as 
antithetical to these conditions due to purely economic 
considerations, there is no guarantee that private ownership by 
the state would automatically satisfy the three conditions.  The 
first condition is the most critical, but is subject to political 
considerations (Yung and Chan 2011). 
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When Condition (a) does not hold, (b) would not exist at all, 
and thus, heritage buildings that sit on the private property of the 
state are subject to the problems of open access.  Even when 
there is an effective closure of a property, its heritage may not 
necessarily be protected, as the purpose of closure is for purposes 
other than conserving heritage buildings.  That is why closed 
access per se is grossly inadequate for conserving, not to say 
nurturing, a resource or building.  A farm is not a zoo.  The first 
two case studies shed light on these points. 
That does not mean access control is insignificant or that 
open access has no merit, as the last example demonstrated.  
Even when a conscious effort is made to deny access, the closure 
can be ineffective, especially if the site is so large that the 
transaction costs of enforcement against trespassing are high.  
The problem of less than 100 percent de facto closure by a 
management authority could also result in some unintended 
advantages, as revealed in the last case study. 
Theoretical support for this point is present in the history of 
maritime aquaculture.  In Hong Kong, as in Norway, marine 
culture by nets/cages originally emerged as a form of squatting 
(Hersoug 2005).  Had the state’s control of its territorial waters 
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been effective and watertight, the industry might not have had 
the chance to develop.  A violation of certain existing rights can be 
a prelude to the emergence of new industries.  In heritage 
conservation, squatters sometimes may help identify, if not also 
create, items of heritage value. 
The typology of Table 1 articulates with the Coasian 
transaction cost view (Barzel 1989) that resources, such as the 
military heritage sites discussed, can be seen as bundles of 
attributes.  Each attribute is associated with distinct 
configurations of exclusion and transaction costs, which influence 
the overlap between the de jure and de facto combinations of 
exclusion, use, income, and transfer rights associated with each 
attribute, subject to physical (spatial) constraints (Webster and 
Lai 2003) such as distance.  For example, there may be strong de 
facto access control over entry into a lighthouse (entry being an 
attribute), but much weaker de facto rights associated with the 
long-distance aesthetic effect of the lighthouse (where an ability 
to see the lighthouse is another valuable resource attribute).  
Such distinctions, illuminated by Schumpeterian innovations (Lai 
and Lorne 2014) would be revealed in the three case studies. 
 
13 
 
The military and property rights interests of the sites 
The three sites selected were all well-connected in military 
geography and history. 
All have a degree of recognised heritage value, as the 
buildings at the first two places were classified by the Antiquities 
Advisory Board as “proposed Grade 2” heritage sites and a public 
museum has been built at the third place, although none has been 
declared a monument under the Antiquities and Monuments 
Ordinance, which would protect it against demolition.  They are 
also all government property.  Their statuses and land tenures 
help avoid many tricky issues of conservation on private property 
and political issues concerning military heritage conservation 
identified by experts (Strange and Walley 2007).  Furthermore, 
they are three “ideal types” of property rights regimes regarding 
access and human intervention.  The observations made are 
based on a 12-year period of ongoing inquiry, which involved 
archival research, aerial photo studies, land surveying, 
engagement with stakeholders, documentary production, and 
university curriculum development sponsored by a Lord Wilson 
Heritage Trust and other public sources of funding.  The Devil’s 
Peak site and the Lei Yue Mun Fort were, respectively, on the 
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northern and southern sides of Lei Yue Mun Pass, the only eastern 
water approach to Victoria Harbour.  The latter site is much older, 
dating back to 1844.  All the artillery installed at the two batteries 
on Devil’s Peak was relocated to the southern part of Hong Kong 
Island, with two pieces going to form Bokhara Battery in Cape 
D’Aguilar.  All three sites saw action during the Battle of Hong 
Kong.  Devil’s Peak was where a heavy rearguard action took place, 
borne mainly by the 5/7 Rajputs and the First Mountain Battery of 
the Hong Kong Singapore Artillery (HKSRA), before the last 
defenders evacuated the mainland side of Hong Kong by dawn on 
13 December 1941. 
Then, the guns in Cape D’Aguilar, manned by the 30 Coastal 
Battery, fired at a Japanese destroyer twice “at extreme range” on 
8 and 16 December before the Japanese made the first attempted 
landing on Hong Kong Island. 
Lei Yue Mun Fort was one of the positions where the 
Japanese successfully landed and fighting at close range took 
place.  This happened before day break on 18/19 December 1941.  
Hong Kong surrendered on Christmas Day 1941, but fighting 
continued in Stanley until the next day. 
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Besides being places of military interest, the three sites are 
useful for discussing the conservation of buildings not owned by 
private individuals.  During the colonial period, the three sites 
were, amongst others, allocated to the War Department.  After 
the defeat of Japan, Devil’s Peak was relinquished by the military. 
We can deduce that the Royal Air Force set up a base at Cape 
D’Aguilar4 till and at the same time the state-owned company, 
Cable and Wireless (now PCCW), became the twin controllers of 
the site until the University of Hong Kong was allocated some land 
to build a marine research station and ancillary quarters there.  
Devil’s Peak became an open access site after the military 
relinquished the site, while Cape D’Aguilar has remained a closed 
area even though it has been demilitarised.  Lei Yue Mun Fort was 
retained by the military for active use until the late 1980s, when it 
was returned to the government as part of the military 
withdrawal programme in the years leading up to 30 June 1997.  
The eastern portion of the fort, then severed from the remaining 
portion by the newly-built Island East Corridor (IEC), which links 
Chai Wan to Causeway Bay, thereby bypassing congested King’s 
4 This is deduced from a 1:600 survey map produced in the late 1950s (Map No.249-NE-
10, sheet opened 24/1/57, Crown Lands and Survey Office, Public Works Department, 
Hong Kong), which annotates one shelter below the gun emplacements “R.A.F. POLICE 
DOG COMPOUND”, another along the vehicular access road “RAF GUARDROOM” and 
one standing to the west of the right emplacement “ORDERLY ROOM”.  
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Road, was allocated to the Urban Services Department (the 
Leisure and Cultural Services Department after 1997) to be 
converted into the Museum of Coastal Defence.  The museum’s 
land parcel (G.L.A. HK-848) consists of Lei Yue Mun Redoubt and 
Pak Sha Wan Battery.  The museum opened to the public on 25 
July 2000 – some seven years after the decision was made to build 
it. 
Table 2 summaries the heritage status and protection of the 
three sites.  The fact that these sites were legally the state’s 
private property, as the site-by-site discussion below will reveal, 
does not mean that this kind of property is immune to the 
problems of open access even if it has been well-built and 
managed.  Likewise, closed access is no guarantee of the proper 
conservation of built heritage. 
Table 2 about here 
(Table 2: Heritage status and the protection of the three selected 
sites) 
Devil’s Peak 
On the summit of the Peak, at about 222 metres, was built a 
stronghold called the Devil’s Peak Redoubt in 1910.  This structure 
had a contiguous firing wall with 120 firing loopholes, some of 
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which were inside two machine gun bastions.  At one point, the 
Redoubt served as the Fire Command East for the artillery and 
was connected to an observation post at 196 metres by a trench 
lined with stones and provided coordinates for Gough Battery at 
160 metres, which had emplacements for a 9.2-inch and a six-inch 
quick firing gun, and Pottinger Battery at 80 metres and its two 
9.2-inch guns (Figure 1).  The military buildings, which are in 
different states of ruin, were identified and surveyed by a 
research team led by the authors under the sponsorship of two 
Lord Wilson Heritage grants.  They include: 
(a) Four Coastal gun emplacements; 
(b) two underground magazines (ammunition vaults); 
(c) two coastal searchlight shelters; 
(d) several shelters (including one that provided power 
generation for an AA gun position and one that served as a 
communications centre); 
(e) observation posts; 
(f) a machine gun stronghold (the Devil’s Peak Redoubt); and 
(g) military paths. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
These building works were mostly constructed of reinforced 
concrete and/or bricks.  All structures were apparently designed 
and built purely from a military function point of view.  This 
functionalist concept can be appreciated in terms of location 
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(chosen to meet strategic objectives), size (big enough to perform 
its intended military function, but small enough to not be easily 
identified or located), shape (circular for gun emplacements and 
rectangular for storage and accommodations), architecture and 
structure (strongly-built with very thick walls and underground 
vaults to withstand combat gunfire), appearance (virtually no 
aesthetic considerations and without any attractive finish or 
colour, except camouflage), etc. 
Due to its close proximity to rural squatter settlements that 
were developed after the war and the recent development of high 
density high-rise public housing and a Chinese cemetery in the 
vicinity, Devil’s Peak is an easily accessible area.  However, 
although the site (the land and buildings there) is entirely owned 
by the government, there is no active public or private 
management of it on a day-to-day basis (i.e., no form of regular 
access restriction or public investment).  While the Green Belt 
zoning in the town plan has a long history, individual buildings 
(the Redoubt and the two batteries) were not graded until 
December 2009.  “Fortifications at Devil's Peak, Sai Kung, N.T.” is 
classified a Grade 2 site on the government list (Item 463) of 
heritage sites.  Grade 2 Buildings are buildings of “special merit” 
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and the policy for them is that “efforts should be made to 
preserve [them] selectively.” 
There is no direct government spending on the conservation 
of the military ruins on Devil’s Peak.  The government’s public 
works projects, notably the extension of the Kai Tak Airport 
runway in the 1970s, actually ended up burying the right gun 
emplacement and magazine of Pottinger Battery, which were 
excavated by a Hong Kong University research team in 2005. 
Small projects launched by a local District Council from 
January to May 2002 actually destroyed a military path by 
carelessly repaving it and ruining a substantial portion of the 
trench connected to the Redoubt with a newly-constructed flight 
of cement steps, replaced the original steel peepholes with PVC 
materials, and deposited concrete on the natural rock outcrop 
near the trig station to create an unnatural and arguably ugly 
viewing platform. 
Morning hikers have contributed to the untidy appearance 
of the ruins by hoisting the national flag on the Redoubt and, 
more recently, at Gough Battery on pennants made of steel, 
building a rope handrail along a dirt track up to the Redoubt from 
the north, planting flowers and fruit trees in the cavities of ruins, 
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and depositing their improvised gardening tools all over the place 
(Figure 2).  Sometimes their building works resembled 
government structures.  A good example is the erection of a 
standard minibus shelter at Gough Battery.  War gamers have left 
a lot of plastic bullets at the site.  More troublesome is that a high 
degree of competition among “common” users has occurred –
planting by one group appears to have been replaced by another 
after a while and political propaganda using abusive and 
sometimes foul language can be seen on the walls of the 
structures.  The illegal gardeners perform their daily chores 
oblivious to the Lands Department’s signs prohibiting private 
agriculture and have colonized three major areas: the 
northeastern part of the Redoubt’s interior; the firing trench and 
the observation posts; and near a two-storey communications 
centre between Gough and Pottinger Batteries.  However, the 
first phase of “rent dissipation” was undertaken during the war by 
the Japanese occupiers, who removed all steel materials (notably 
the doors of the shell expense chambers in the gun emplacements 
and the doors and shutters of the bunkers).  A post-war building 
boom led to the systematic removal of bricks that lined the roofs 
of the arched underground magazine vaults below the gun 
emplacements.  An aerial photo taken in 1964 showed lines of 
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bricks being placed out in the sun in the open area of the battery.  
This was likely for drying purposes. 
Figure 2 about here 
The present state of affairs of the military buildings on 
Devil’s Peak that survived the war is due to the absence of all 
three conditions typical of open access government land.  In 
terms of conventional transaction costs reasoning, the state of 
affairs on Devil’s Peak can be explained in terms of its relatively 
good accessibility and social visibility in a low bid rent urban area.  
If it was located in a higher rent area, as in the case of the disused 
Pinewood Battery above the University of Hong Kong, it would 
have been actively managed.  
Cape D’Aguilar 
Located on the Southeastern tip of Shek O Peninsula is Cape 
D’Aguilar.  This wavy area has a good view of the Pacific Ocean 
and Bokhara Battery was built there in a hurry before World War 
II to provide better coastal gunfire cover of Hong Kong’s southern 
territorial waters.  Installed on a cliff of a higher promontory on 
each side of a three-storey battery observation and command 
post was a 9.2-inch gun emplacement.  The two guns were 
originally deployed at Pottinger.  To the east of the Battery, on a 
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lower promontory, through which a sea arch can be found, stands 
the Cape D’Aguilar Lighthouse, which was built during the 
Nineteenth Century, which is a statutorily declared monument, 
and the more recent Hong Kong University marine research 
student quarters.  On the eastern side of this promontory is the 
Hong Kong University marine research centre, which faces a small 
sea arch that gave the place its Chinese name “Hok Tsui”, literally 
“Crane Beak.”  The coast and sea along this promontory is a 
statutory marine reserve.  The lighthouse, student quarters, and 
marine research centre are all within an area closed to visitors 
and access is restricted to it by PCCW, which uses the area for its 
own telecommunications business.  PCCW also has a private 
“Rural Building Lot” for a submarine cable house. 
The disused military buildings, each in a different state of 
ruin, that were identified and surveyed by the authors under the 
sponsorship of a Lord Wilson Heritage grant include: 
(a) two coastal gun emplacements; 
(b) two coastal searchlight shelters; 
(c) a number of shelters; and 
(d) a fire command post. 
 
Like those on Devil’s Peak, the military buildings were mostly 
constructed of reinforced concrete.  There are some differences in 
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the quality of the workmanship and style between the building 
works here and at Devil’s Peak.  Other than the fact that the 
workmanship for the gun aprons was poorer here, this battery 
differs from its Devil’s Peak counterparts in that it had no 
underground magazine.  The civilian buildings and facilities 
presently at the site include: 
(a) University research buildings and staff/student quarters; 
(b) an old lighthouse (Cape D’Aguilar Lighthouse); 
(c) telecommunications installations; and 
(d) government signboards. 
 
All civilian building works and facilities were well-maintained. 
Due to its remote location, its narrow and winding access 
road (Hok Tsui Road, which was part of the old Occupation Road, 
now called Shek O Road, during the colonial era), entry 
restrictions due to PCCW’s status as the leaseholder, and the 
preservation nature of the marine reserve, Cape D’Aguilar is a 
highly exclusive area to which only a few individuals can enter.  
No signs of adventurous and industrious morning hikers or war 
gamers are present here.  However, the military structures here 
look poorer than those on Devil’s Peak, even though the latter are 
at least 35 years older.  The UHF installations (including a 
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monocone antenna) at the right gun emplacement that were still 
tidy in October 2002 were in a wasted state during a visit in 
November 2012 due to the abandonment of this outmoded form 
of emergency communications with ships.  The front of the roof of 
the second floor of the OP was intact in 2002 (Figure 3), but had 
completely collapsed during the November 2012 visit.  The roof of 
the left searchlight shelter position has suffered a similar fate.  
Besides, the well-mown lawn outside the row of shelters to the 
west of the gun emplacements had become an unkempt bush by 
the last visit).  As in the case of Devil’s Peak, the root actions of 
plants and erosion, especially in an area that receives the ion-rich 
spray of the sea waves, will eventually corrode all structures to a 
state beyond repair unless immediate rescue action is taken. 
Figure 3 about here 
“Bokhara Battery, D'Aguilar Peninsula, H.K.” was, in 
December 2009, at the same time as Devil’s Peak, classified as a 
Grade 2 building on the government list (Item 391) of heritage 
sites.  The lighthouse is a declared monument. 
The state of affairs of the military buildings that survived the 
war at Bokhara Battery is due to the absence of conditions (a) and, 
hence, (b), although (c) is also present.  Mere exclusion is not 
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sufficient for even the preservation, not to mention the 
conservation, of the buildings. 
In terms of received transaction costs consideration, the 
state of affairs at Bokhara Battery are its remoteness and, hence, 
low social visibility of the site in a countryside setting and public 
utility function of the promontory.  In a more visible countryside 
location, as in the case of the disused Chung Hom Kok Battery, it 
would have been better managed.  
 
Coastal Defence Museum, Lei Yue Mun Fort 
The Coastal Defence Museum in Shaukeiwan comprises only the 
southern half of a Government Land Allocation that consists 
principally of the Lei Yue Mun Redoubt with two six-inch quick 
firing gun positions, over which a huge canopy has been erected 
to create an air-conditioned museum, and the Lei Yue Mun 
Passage Battery for two small caliber guns.  There is no plan to 
rehabilitate the nearby Pak Sha Wan Battery, which is now under 
dense vegetation cover and has become a haven for wild animals 
(snakes and wild boars) to the north east of Lei Yue Mun Redoubt.  
The museum can be criticized for not having any information on 
the Royal Navy or the Japanese Imperial Navy, which played a part 
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in the history of Hong Kong, or any display on coastal defence 
works on military sites elsewhere during the colonial period.  The 
adjoining Pak Sha Wan Battery is a case in point.  The building 
works there include batteries, pillboxes, searchlight shelters, naval 
dockyards, etc.  Nevertheless, one should sympathize with the 
precursor of the museum, which ran on a very tight schedule 
before the 1997 handover.  In any case, the treatment of this part 
of the Fort has been far better than government efforts to 
preserve built heritage anywhere else in Hong Kong other than 
the Lei Yue Mun holiday village, which is the former Lei Yue Mun 
Fort to the east of the IEC.  Compared to Devil’s Peak and Bokhara 
Battery, this site is exemplary in terms of the government’s efforts 
at preservation.  Its existence provides hope for an expansion to 
incorporate the Pak Sha Wan Battery site or a duplication of the 
same approach elsewhere. 
The Museum is opened to the public every day except 
Thursday and a nominal entry fee of HK$20 is charged.  Senior 
citizens and students enjoy a 50% discount.  Access control is near 
perfection, as there are many security guards patrolling all key 
positions and ingresses/egresses.  CCTV monitoring is also 
comprehensive.  The site has no sign of graffiti and conditions are 
neat and tidy.  The vintage military structures here were much 
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older than those on the two other sites we visited, but there are 
more visible traces of battle damage.  Since all the military 
structures have been restored and opened to the public as 
displays, they are in excellent condition.  This state of affairs owes 
thanks to the presence of the three conditions present here.  The 
museum was designed to blend in with the surrounding 
topography and all new structures have done that with the 
existing military facilities in terms of use, scale, colour, and 
materials. 
Key lessons on access and management learnt 
The observations on the three sites were those obtained by the 
authors, whose team has researched them for 12 years.  The 
sequence of the case studies is not random, but carefully decided.  
A Hong Kong person who has never gone up to Devil’s Peak would 
find the site scenic on arrival, but will usually be annoyed after 
seeing the results of careless human disturbance – especially 
when they are advised that some of the alterations were done 
using taxpayers’ money.  Anyone who visits Devil’s Peak after 
having heard of the concept of “the tragedy of the commons” 
may imagine that closed access, like for Cape D’Aguilar, is a 
solution to heritage conservation.  But when one visits Bokhara 
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Battery to have a closer look at the conditions of its buildings, one 
would likely be shocked by their degrees of deterioration, which 
stand in sharp contrast to the neat and scenic environment and 
well-maintained Lighthouse, a declared monument, and student 
quarters, managed by the University of Hong Kong, in the vicinity.  
One's gut reaction after visiting the Lei Yue Mun Redoubt area 
would be that the museum is the best solution.  That, to a great 
extent, is true.  However, the museum in Lei Yue Mun is not as 
fully gated as Cape D’Aguilar or the bank gold vault that stands 
next to it.  Some fishers and adventurers do trespass into Pak Sha 
Wan Battery and test the coastal margins of the museum.  
Chinese fishermen who dared not build anything when the British 
were stationed at the Fort have since built a bright yellow temple 
on a concrete platform (which probably housed a gun previously) 
along the rocky shore outside the gated area of the museum to 
worship their gods (Figure 4).  In other words, only part of the 
land allocated to the museum has access restrictions.  Due to the 
thickness of the vegetation there, the difficult topography, and 
probably the recent military past of the site, the degree of abuse 
by intruders has been minimal compared to that which has 
occurred at Devil’s Peak. 
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The intrusion of visitors just outside the confines of the 
museum actually helps advance heritage conservation planning.  
The erection of the bright yellow temple, which mirrors a red Tin 
Hau (Mother of Heaven) Temple across Lei Yue Mun Pass in the 
coastal squatter village below Devil’s Peak, led the authors to 
discover Searchlight Emplacements Numbers 3 and 4, which were 
built at around 1902, while they searched for a supposed pillbox 
or quick-firing emplacement with the permission of the museum 
on 13 December 2012.  These emplacements could be found in 
the drawings of the “Fortification Design Branch,” which were 
deposited in the UK without the museum’s knowledge or are 
available in the extant literature.  Only No.3 emplacement could 
be easily spotted in the old aerial photos of 1949 and 1963. 
Figure 4 about here 
The case of the Museum of Coastal Defence is interesting, as 
it resembles both Devil’s Peak and Bokhara Battery in terms of 
accessibility and social visibility.  However, ideas and efforts have 
transformed the site and enhanced its value.  Although it can be 
criticised in terms of the various criteria of authenticity, the 
investment in the museum has gone well beyond the degree of 
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conserving Pinewood or Chung Hum Kok Battery.  This shows the 
effect of Schumpeterian innovation.  
 
Visitors to Devil’s Peak sometimes cause hill fires.  While 
these are disastrous from a botanist’s point of view, they are most 
welcomed by archaeologists and surveyors, as they clear the 
vegetation and expose military structures.  In October 2012, the 
authors’ team could no longer reach Pottinger Battery (which they 
dug out in 2006 from the earth filling deposited there by the Kai 
Tak runway project team) due to the overgrowth that recolonized 
the area.  Access is now naturally blocked and nobody can easily 
gain entry to get a closer look at the battery. 
An interesting thought about the morning hikers who 
“privatized” parts of Devil’s Peak as their own or for their political 
platforms is that non-governmental energy could have been 
channeled by NGOs to create new social heritage spots without 
further harming the built heritage so as to empower the local 
community.  That the Fisher’s Association in Norway emerged as 
an important NGO when the state granted licences to culturists to 
stop open access to the coastal ocean proves the viability of this 
approach.  This should not demand too much public funding, but 
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will have to involve community action facilitated by the local 
District Council. 
The temple erected within the museum’s premises by 
intruders poses a challenge, but also an opportunity, to the 
present landowner by realigning the management strategy of the 
museum.  When suitably modified, following the example of the 
statue in Repulse Bay that used to attract a lot of Japanese 
tourists during the 1970s, this illegal structure can become a 
scenic spot for the public after being transformed from an eye 
score into an art piece. 
From the above comparative study informed by the 
discussion on property rights regimes, the following property 
rights lessons on conserving military heritage buildings, which add 
to the basic tenets of the “tragedy of the commons” and often do 
not apply to land property, can be learnt. 
First, in terms of property rights classification, as shown in 
Table 1, the type of property rights for Devil’s Peak is principally 
DI with a degree of DII.  Both Bokhara Battery and Lee Yue Mun 
Redoubt are DIII.  
Second, effective access restrictions (Condition (c)) are do 
not guaranteed heritage conservation without intention 
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(Condition (a)), even when the land is under state ownership and 
control.  Enclosure alone is not adequate for conserving built 
heritage. 
Third, even land under active facility and property 
management (when all conditions are present) often leaves gaps 
of unauthorized entry when the site is large. 
Fourth, entrants to private government land with or without 
access restrictions sometimes, albeit unintentionally, provide 
lessons to heritage researchers and even generate new heritage 
values.  The rope rail erected up the Devil’s Peak Redoubt by 
hikers and the temple outside the Museum of Coastal Defence are 
cases in point. 
Fifth, a degree of communal property rights should emerge 
to restrict access to certain places for the enjoyment by some (in 
the case of Devil’s Peak), and this rational attempt to limit rent 
dissipation must be regarded as a problem by the landowner 
because when competition escalates, there can be conflicts and 
harm the built heritage in question.  When an innovative solution 
is feasible, the problem can be transformed into a positive 
externality (Lai and Lorne 2006; 2014). 
Discussion and conclusion 
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This paper uses a Coasian methodology informed by 
Schumpeterian innovation to show the subtle difference between 
common access and common property, which has not been well 
recognized in the economic literature.  The interesting finding was 
that open access can be a source of information that opens up 
new parameters for consideration, which the existing property 
right literature has not addressed. Note also that the distinction 
between de jure and de facto property rights is theoretically 
significant in discussing the so-called “ambiguous property rights” 
(Lai and Lorne 2014).   
This Hong Kong case study of three sites with colonial 
military buildings of recognised heritage values adds, in light of 
transaction costs and innovations, to our understanding of access 
restrictions for conservation research and planning.  The idea that 
open access can be a source of information, on the basis of which 
innovative management may be adopted, is something that the 
authors hope environmental economists will take up in theory. 
Our submission is in theoretical agreement with the views of 
Feeny et al. (1996) and Ostrom (2000), which argued that 
communal (which they called common) property can play a 
positive role in conservation. This paper, however, does not 
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promote any ideological public or market solution.  The former 
was criticized by Nobel laureate, Austrian economist Hayek, in The 
Constitution Liberty (Hayek 1960), while a market solution was 
considered viable by some theorists (Hojman and Hiscock 2010). 
For the state to put matters into practice is not easy due to 
the post-colonial politics of public consultations (Lu 2009, Yung 
and Chen 2011), even if they have the government’s blessings and 
funding is ample due to various regulatory requirements (Davies 
2012).  It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer immediate 
solutions to the problems of deterioration in built military 
heritage in first two cases or ways to conserve Pak Sha Wan 
Battery in Lei Yue Mun. 
In any case, a simplistic enclosure approach to heritage sites 
is surely not the way for conservation. Furthermore, the public 
can be a source of heritage values and there can inhibition of 
innovations if there is too much exclusion.  After all, conservation 
is supposed to be for public enjoyment. 
Zoos are not animal farms.  Although a zoo keeps animals 
and prevents them from human disturbance, it does not nurture 
them.  An animal farm is not a zoo either because active human 
intervention in the form of animal husbandry takes place there.  
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This account of two distinct forms of resource management, both 
predicated on restricted access, informs us that merely enclosing 
a resource is, in itself, insufficient for its transformation.  Likewise, 
heritage building conservation calls for active human intervention 
beyond mere enclosures. 
In closing, we say that a more sensational  metaphor than 
“farm vs. zoo” for the military heritage facilities in question is 
probably “dead or alive” in the sense that if these non-civilian 
facilities were simply enclosed or sealed up, they would truly be 
dead!  If, on the other hand, military buildings can be transformed, 
this can bring to life a development path that was not intended 
for their original function of inflicting death.  
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